GEOFF BENNETT: This Saturday marks two years since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a war that started nearly 10 years ago.

With the conflict at a frozen and brutal stalemate, Nick Schifrin now takes stock of what's been gained and all that's been lost.

NICK SCHIFRIN: In two years, countless wives now widows, sons now orphans, the dead stolen of their dignity and 10 million forced to flee their homes, the largest refugee crisis since World War II.

Everyone everywhere carries the war's scars.

And so Ukraine fights; 300,000 soldiers are determined, but exhausted, outmanned and increasingly outgunned.

In some areas, for every artillery shell that they fire, Russian soldiers fire 10.

Two years ago today, before the full-scale invasion, Russia occupied 7 percent of Ukraine.

On March 22, 2022, Moscow expanded control to 27 percent.

Ukraine has won back about half that newly captured territory, but Russia still occupies 18 percent.

Recently, Ukraine pushed the Russian navy further back into the Black Sea, increased exports, and now increasingly threatens occupied Crimea.

But it recently lost the eastern city of Avdiivka.

The Russian military has momentum as Ukraine waits for U.S. aid, without which senior U.S. officials fear Ukraine will lose.

We now take a look at where the war is, where it could go, and U.S. policy toward Ukraine with three views.

Michael Kofman is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

John Mearsheimer is a political science professor at the University of Chicago.

And Rebeccah Heinrichs is senior fellow and director of the Keystone Defense Initiative at the Hudson Institute, a Washington think tank.

Thanks so much.

All of you, welcome back to the "NewsHour."

Michael Kofman, let me start with you.

As we just said, Ukraine has lost Avdiivka.

They're increasingly outgunned, outmanned.

How bad is it?

MICHAEL KOFMAN, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Look, Ukraine starts 2024 in a very difficult position.

That is very clear.

Ukraine has a deficit in terms of artillery ammunition.

Part of that is because it depends on Western support for munitions, and it has a deficit of manpower.

It needs to replenish the force, particularly the infantry component of the force.

Now, while it's true that Russia is materially advantaged in this war, that much is clear, if we look at manpower, particularly if we look at artillery, to a lesser extent, equipment, that advantage at this stage is not decisive either.

The battle for Avdiivka, which was a five-month grinding fight, tells us about the challenges both militaries face.

Ukraine was forced to retreat after fighting a defensive battle, but it inflicted very high costs on the Russian military.

It cost the Russian military almost an entire army's worth of equipment, and equipment remains the limiting factor for them.

So, that being said, this year is clearly looking like a year during which Ukraine is going to focus most likely much more on holding, defending, trying to rebuild and reconstitute the force, and maybe creating challenges for the Russian armed forces with expanded strike campaigns.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Rebeccah Heinrichs, do you agree with that assessment?

And do you think the U.S. needs to go further than it has so far in its support?

REBECCAH HEINRICHS, Hudson Institute: I do agree with Mike's assessment.

You can look at all of the things that have not been going well for Ukraine.

Ukraine has clearly demonstrated an amazing ability to make gains and Retake territory, strong will to fight, strong and greater sense of national identity.

And so what Ukraine needs now into the next year, agree with Michael, it needs to be resupplied, but also longer-range strike systems, drones, bigger drones that can carry longer-range strike systems in order to reach Russian targets, not just in Ukraine, but outside Ukraine into Russian territory.

NICK SCHIFRIN: So, John Mearsheimer, what do you think about that, that all that Ukraine needs to do is hold the line and that the U.S. should increase its support for Ukraine over the coming years in order for Ukraine to be able to achieve what it needs?

JOHN MEARSHEIMER, University of Chicago: Well, I disagree.

I think that Ukraine has already lost the war.

It's lost 20 percent of its territory, according to my calculations.

And it's not going to conquer that territory and get it back, as was demonstrated in the failed counteroffensive of last year.

The key to understanding where this war is headed is to know that it is a war of attrition.

This is two armies that are standing toe-to-toe and beating the living daylights out of each other.

And the question is, which army bleeds which army first?

And it's quite clear that the Russians are bleeding the Ukrainians white.

As the setup piece made clear, the Russians have about a 10-1 advantage in artillery.

And there's nothing we can do to fix that in the foreseeable future, because we don't have artillery on the shelf that we can give them.

Furthermore, in terms of manpower, they are in absolutely terrible shape.

They say they need a mobilization and will bring into the force 500,000 troops.

They are not going to be able to mobilize 500,000 troops.

In my opinion, they will be lucky if they can mobilize 150,000 troops.

And they're already greatly outnumbered by the Russians, because the Russian population is five times bigger than the Ukrainian population.

So when you look at the metrics that really matter in a war of attrition, the Ukrainians are in a terrible situation, and this situation only gets worse with time.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Michael Kofman, take on those points, that there's not enough artillery to send them, that they will not have enough manpower, and -- quote -- "Ukraine has already lost."

MICHAEL KOFMAN: OK, first of all, I just have to disagree on the facts.

The United States has plenty of artillery.

It just doesn't have the money.

And artillery production both in the United States and European Union is increasing significantly.

We will be in a much better position by 2025 than we are now.

Second, Russia's fires advantage right now is about 5-1.

It's not the size of fires advantage, given the main constraints the force has.

Third, when it comes to manpower, there's a lot more to military analysis than basic algebra.

It's much more about how you use the forces you have and your ability to convert your resources into combat-capable and effective formations.

Russia has a lot more people on paper.

That is true, but the Russian forces in Ukraine don't actually outnumber the Ukrainian troops on the front line by that much at all.

Russia is feeding off of Soviet legacy, pulling equipment from its warehouses.

It lost a ton of it over the battle of Avdiivka.

It can't keep doing that too many times, all right?

And if Russia is not on track and doesn't look like they're actually really winning this war by the time we get into 2025, their negotiating position becomes actually very uncertain.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Rebeccah Heinrichs, is Ukraine already losing?

And is it a rump state, as John Mearsheimer said?

REBECCAH HEINRICHS: No, of course not.

The United States currently has ready to send Ukraine as soon as Congress gives a go-ahead and passes this national security supplemental.

We have also seen the United States and other Western companies be able to adapt actually very quickly, increase the production of key munitions, and tick them over to the battlefield very, very quickly.

So, for the medium and long term, it does have the ability to produce these weapons to get them to Ukraine if there is the will to do so.

And so this isn't just all good and positive things going for Russia.

It does have to look elsewhere also.

And so the same situation is for Ukraine.

It's going to look to the West.

NICK SCHIFRIN: John Mearsheimer, take on those points, one, that the U.S. and Europe are increasing their production to be able to send to Ukraine, and, two, that, in general, Russia does not have the decisive advantage that you think it does.

JOHN MEARSHEIMER: It's clear from almost all the accounts in the media that the Russians have roughly a 10-to-1 advantage in artillery.

If Michael's correct that the artillery is on the shelf, why don't we give it or why haven't we given it to the Ukrainians?

And the fact is, it's not on the shelf.

We don't have the artillery tubes or shells to give to them.

And he says that we will make a substantial improvement in that regard by 2025.

I would remind him that this is February 2024.

And we have a lot of months to go before we get to 2025.

And if you look at the Russians, they have a significant industrial base that can pump out lots of weapons.

And they're doing exactly that, which is why they have a 10-to-1 advantage.

Furthermore, if you look at manpower, there are some reports that the average age of Ukrainian forces is 43 years old.

They're having a significant problem with draft dodgers back in Kyiv and other places in Ukraine.

This mobilization is not going to be able to produce 500,000 troops.

And Zaluzhnyi and other generals have said they need 500,000 troops because the Russians have much larger numbers of troops.

So in a war of attrition, if you're outnumbered in terms of artillery and you're outnumbered in terms of manpower, you're really in big trouble.

And you saw this in Avdiivka, where the Ukrainians just suffered a humiliating defeat.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Michael Kofman, what is victory for Ukraine and can it achieve it?

MICHAEL KOFMAN: Yes, what does victory look like?

Ukraine is able to achieve an end to the war on terms favorable to itself that does not involve it sacrificing any significant amount of sovereignty or compromising its economic viability as a state.

And, ideally and most importantly, Ukraine avoids having to negotiate from a position of weakness, where Russia achieves a victor's peace.

And I think that's possible and it's still feasible at this point, but I won't argue that Ukraine does not have a difficult path ahead of it.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Rebeccah Heinrichs, you talk about attacking inside Russia.

Some U.S. officials, as you know, are worried about escalation.

Do you think they should be?

REBECCAH HEINRICHS: To end this war on terms that favored Ukraine, to give Ukraine the strongest hand to play to end this conflict that leaves itself with a strong hand to protect itself from further incursions is to make sure that Ukraine can inflict pain on Russia so that Russia decides that it's no longer worth the risk and the cost to continue moving forward.

To do that, you have to inflict pain.

And Russia can no longer be a sanctuary for where it is launching its attacks and where its logistics are.

So, Ukraine has already been hitting some of those targets.

It's just not been permitted to do so with Western weapons.

And that needs to change if we're going to actually change the tide of the war and enable Ukraine, as Michael said, to have a strong hand to play to end this war.

NICK SCHIFRIN: John Mearsheimer, final word.

JOHN MEARSHEIMER: And I just want to point out that you want to understand that we armed up and we trained the Ukrainians for a major counteroffensive last summer.

And that counteroffensive was a colossal failure.

And given what's happened since then, there is no reason to think that the Ukrainians can go on the offensive and win a war against the Russians.

And, if anything, it's quite clear that the balance of power over time has shifted in the Russians' favor, and it's likely to continue to shift further in the Russians' favor moving forward.

So we are in deep trouble in Ukraine.

NICK SCHIFRIN: John Mearsheimer, Rebeccah Heinrichs, Michael Kofman, thank you very much to all of you.